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STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction for this appeal from the First Circuit 
Court of Box Elder County, Brigham City Department to the 
Court of Appeals is proper pursuant to UTAH CODE ANNOTATED, 
Section 78-2A-3. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
I. 
Where the arresting officer properly stopped the 
vehicle with reasonable suspicion that the driver was 
operating the vehicle without a valid driver's license, was 
the request that the driver produce his driver's license 
reasonably related in scope to the initial s^ top? 
II. 
Does UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §41-2-124 permit a request for 
production of a valid driver's license wher^ the initial 
stop of the vehicle was made with the requirjed reasonable 
suspicion? 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from defendant's convections in the 
First Circuit Court of Box Elder County, Br[Lgham City 
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Department, the Honorable Robert W. Daines, presiding. 
Defendant, Steven W. Murphy, was convicted of driving under 
the influence of alcohol and driving on suspension. 
Defendant, Darrell R. Murhpyf was convicted of illegal 
possession of alcohol. Defendants appeal these convictions 
upon the grounds that the trial court erred in not granting 
defendants' motion to suppress all of the evidence. Judge 
Stanton Taylor denied the Motion to Suppress preceding the 
trial before Judge Daines. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
A narrative written by the arresting officer states the 
facts upon which the trial court relied in ruling on the 
Motion to suppress the evidence. A copy of this narrative 
is attached to the appellantfs brief in the addendum. 
On October 3/ 1986 the arresting officer received a 
radio call which informed him that another officer had seen 
a vehicle belonging to Darrell Murphy, and he believed 
Darrell was driving on suspension. The arresting officer 
confirmed that Darrell Murphy's license had been suspended, 
proceeded to the indicated area, and observed the vehicle. 
He stated that as the suspect vehicle turned in front of 
him, his headlights illuminated the inside of the vehicle, 
and it appeared to him that the driver was Darrell. Based 
upon this, the arresting officer stopped the vehicle. 
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When the officer approached the vehicle and spoke with 
the driver, he ascertained it was Steven Murphy and that 
Darrell Murphy was the passenger. Both of these brothers 
appeared in court, and it is beyond dispute that their 
physical similarities are so close they could pass for 
identical twins. They are the same size, build and 
complexions, and they have the same hair stjyle and hair 
length. 
At this point the arresting officer explained the 
reason for the stop and requested the driver, Steven Murphy, 
to provide a driver's license. Steven responded that he did 
not have his license with him. The arresting officer 
checked the status of Steven's license through his 
dispatcher and was informed that Steven's license had been 
suspended and the vehicle registration had expired more than 
90 days previously. This was actually the second time 
Steven's license had been suspended. The first time for an 
accumulation of speeding and reckless driving violations, 
the second time for hit and run and alcohol violations. 
When the arresting officer returned to the vehicle, he 
noticed the smell of alcohol coming from Steven's breath and 
later noticed a similar smell from Darrell's breath. Both 
failed the field sobriety tests and the intoMlyzer tests. 
Darrell Murphy was a minor at this time, born January 13, 
1967. 
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SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The arresting officer was justified in stopping 
defendant's vehicle, when the officer had reasonable 
suspicion that the driver was operating the vehicle with a 
suspended driver's license. The initial stop of the vehicle 
was not an unreasonable intrusion on defendant's Fourth 
Amendment rights. Once a proper initial stop was made, the 
officer could request production of a driver's license. 
This action is reasonably related in scope to the initial 
stop on suspicion of driving without a valid license. UTAH 
CODE ANNOTATED, §41-2-124, permits the officer to request 
production of a driver's license, when the initial stop is 
justifiably made. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER WAS JUSTIFIED IN MAKING THE 
INITIAL STOP WITH REASONABLE SUSPICION THAT THE 
DRIVER WAS DRIVING ON A SUSPENDED DRIVER'S LICENSE. 
The Fourth Amendment provides that "the right of the 
people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and 
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall 
not be violated . . . " Whenever an individual may harbor a 
reasonable expectation of privacy, he is entitled to be free 
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from unreasonable government intrusion. Katz v. United 
States, 389 U.S 347, 88 S.Ct. 507 (1967). Of course, what 
the Constitution forbids is not all searches and seizures, 
but unreasonable searches and seizures. Terry v. Ohio, 392 
U.S. 1, 88 S.Ct. 1868 (1968). In determining whether the 
seizure and search were unreasonable the inquiry is a dual 
one — whether the officer's action was justified at its 
inception, and whether it was reasonable related in scope to 
the circumstances which justified the interjference in the 
first place. Ld. at 19. 
In this instance it is uncontested that the arresting 
officer's action was justified at its inception. He 
observed the vehicle, saw the driver, and irmed that the 
driver may have been driving on suspension. Clearly, the 
arresting officer possessed the required reasonable 
suspicion which justified him in making the initial stop of 
the vehicle to check for the violation of driving on a 
suspended license. The stop was not an unreasonable 
intrusion. 
POINT II. 
THE ARRESTING OFFICER'S REQUEST TO PRODUCE A 
DRIVER'S LICENSE WAS REASONABLY RELATED IN SCOPE 
TO THE INITIAL STOP ON SUSPICION OF THE DRIVER 
OPERATING ON A SUSPENDED DRIVER'S LICENSE. 
We turn now to the second part of the dual inquiry — 
whether the officerfs action was reasonably related in scope 
to the circumstances which justified the interference in the 
first place. The permissibility of a particular law 
5 
enforcement practice is judged by balancing its intrusion on 
the individual's Fourth Amendment interests against its 
promotion of legitimate governmental interests. Delaware v. 
Prousef 440 U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979). In this case 
the individual's interests must be balanced against the 
State's interests in promoting public safety upon its roads 
by insuring that only those qualified to do so are permitted 
to operate motor vehicles, and hence that licensing 
requirements are being observed. 
Courts have looked at the reasonableness of a request 
for a driver's license once a justified initial stop has 
been made. In Adams v. Williams, 407 U.S. 143, 92 S.Ct. 
1921 (1972), the United States Supreme Court said in dictum: 
"A brief stop of a suspicious individual, in order to 
determine his identity or to maintain the status quo 
momentarily while obtaining more information, may be 
most reasonable in light of the facts known to the 
officer at the time." Id_. at 146. 
The Supreme Court of Hawaii followed this approach in 
State v. Powell, 603 P2d 143 (Hawaii 1979), where a police 
officer stopped a vehicle believing that the driver was 
either lost, experiencing mechanical difficulties, or 
intoxicated. After ruling that the intrusion of the initial 
stop was reasonable and that the officer had the required 
reasonable suspicion, the court stated the following in its 
holding: 
"(H)aving determined that the initial stop of 
appellee's vehicle was justified, we also believe that 
it was reasonable for the officer to request to see 
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appellee's driver's license. When investigating a 
possible violation of a traffic law, an officer may 
properly ask a driver to display his license so that he 
may, in the first instance, determine I who he is dealing 
with and whether such person is qualified to drive." 
In Powell as in the present case, the police officer upon 
stopping the driver simply requested the driver to produce 
his driver's license. The officer's request for the driver 
to produce a driver's license was reasonably related in 
scope to the initial stop to investigate a suspicious 
situation. 
Two Arizona courts have ruled similarlV. In State v. 
Puig, 112 Ariz. 519, 544 P.2d 201 (Ariz. 1975), the 
patrolman stopped the vehicle when he suspected that the 
turn signals were inoperative. He asked for the driver's 
license and registration, and the driver wa^ unable to 
produce either. On appeal the Arizona Suprdme Court held 
that the evidence should not be suppressed stating that "a 
police officer may first request the driver's license and 
registration before conducting a safety inspection." The 
Arizona Court of Appeals followed the Puig holding in State 
vs. Gradillas, 25 Ariz. App. 510, 544 P.2d 1111 (1976), 
where the officer noted suspicious behavior, saw no 
expiration date on a temporary registration sticker, and 
stopped the vehicle. After ruling that the initial stop was 
reasonable the court held, citing Puig, that "the officer 
had the right upon stopping the vehicle, to immediately 
demand production of the driver's license and registration." 
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The Colorado Court of Appeals held that the officer had 
the right to ascertain the driver's name (by production of 
driver's license) and to ascertain ownership of the car, 
when the officer approached the car to determine if the 
occupants were having car trouble. People v. Davis, 565 
P.2d 1347 (Colo. Ct. App. 1977). The officer had no 
suspicion of criminal behavior. Similarly, the Oregon Court 
of Appeals in a per curiam opinion held that a police 
officer, after pulling in behind a driver's 
apparently-disabled vehicle, may request to see a driver's 
license. State v. Thornton, 62 Or.App. 468, 661 P.2d 555 
(1983). 
In the present case, the arresting officer's request to 
see a driver's license was reasonably related in scope to 
the circumstances justifying the initial stop. Since the 
initial stop was justified, the officer should be able to 
request production of a driver's license, as was allowed in 
the above cited cases. Certainly, a request for a driver's 
license is reasonably related to the suspicion that the 
driver is operating on a suspended license. In the first 
instance the officer should be allowed to determine who he 
is dealing with and whether that person is qualified to 
drive. 
POINT III. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED §41-2-124 PERMITS A 
REQUEST FOR PRODUCTION OF DRIVER'S LICENSE 
WHEN THE VEHICLE HAS BEEN STOPPED JUSTIFIABLY. 
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Utah Code Annotated §41-2-124 subsection (1) provides 
that "the licensee shall have his license in his immediate 
possession at all times when operating a motor vehicle and 
shall display it upon demand of a justice o|f peace, a peace 
officer, or a field deputy or inspector of the division." 
i 
The clear intent of this statute is simply to permit the 
officer to demand the license of the driver whose vehicle 
has been stopped for an otherwise proper purpose. See 
People vs. McPherson, 550 P.2d 311 (Colo. Ct.App. 1976) 
("The demand for defendant to present his license was proper 
only if the officers properly stopped him in the first 
I 
place"). This reasonable intrusion is not only permissible 
but necessary in order to give effect to the statute 
requiring the carrying of a driver's license]. Noncompliance 
with licensing requirements are not effectively detectable 
or deferrable without some form of on-the-spot inspection 
procedure. Therefore, the arresting officer in the present 
case appropriately requested production of a driver's 
license, when the vehicle was properly stopped. 
POINT IV. 
THE RULE IN THE PRESENT CASE IS APPLICABLE TO 
CIRCUMSTANCES WHERE A PROPER INITIAL STCJP WAS 
MADE, AND DOES NOT APPLY TO ARBITRARY Sl{OPS 
TO CHECK FOR PROPER DRIVER'S LICENSE. 
Appellant cites authority from cases thajt are factually 
not on point with the present case* The casejs involve 
factual situations where the initial stop by the officer 
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was made in an arbitrary manner, without reasonable 
suspicion of criminal activity. See Delaware v. Prouse, 440 
U.S. 648, 99 S.Ct. 1391 (1979); Commonwealth v. Swanger, 307 
A.2d 875 (Pa. 1973); State v. Ochoa, 112 Ariz. 582, 544 P.2d 
1097 (Ariz. 1976). The present case involves a proper 
initial stop and request for production of driver's license. 
Respondant does not suggest that officers should be allowed 
to stop vehicles without reasonable suspicion of criminal 
activity, rather that after a proper stop the officer should 
be allowed to request to see the driver's license of the 
operator. 
CONCLUSION 
The arresting officer properly requested the driver to 
produce a valid driver's license, after the officer had made 
a justifiable stop of the driver's vehicle on reasonable 
suspicion that driver was operating with a suspended 
license. Therefore, the trial court appropriately refused 
to grant defendants' Motion to Suppress and defendants' 
convictions should be affirmed. 
DATED this day of October, 1987. 
Ben H. Hadfield 
Phillip W. Hadfield 
Attorneys for 
Plaintiff/Respondant 
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I hereby certify that I mailed four (4) copies of the 
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Michael L. Miller 
Attorney for Defendant 
20 South Main 
P. 0. Box 399 
Brigham City, Utah 84302 
postage prepaid this day of , 1987. 
Ben H. Hadfield 
Attorney for 
Plaint if f/Res|?ondant 
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ADDENDUM 
41-2-124. License to be carried when operating motor 
vehicle -- Production in court. 
(1) The licensee shall have his license in his 
immediate possession at all times when operating a motor 
vehicle and shall display it upon demand of a justice of 
peace, a peace officer, or a field deputy or inspector of 
the division. 
(2) It is a defense to a charge under this section 
that the person charged produces in court a license issued 
to him and valid at the time of his citation or arrest. 
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